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THE ROLE OF AGENCY: COMPENSATED SURROGACY
AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION PRACTICES
June Carbone ∗ and Jody Lyneé Madeira ∗∗
Abstract: The surrogacy debate often conflates what should be seen as three distinct
issues: the permissibility of the practice under any circumstances, the role of for-profit
intermediaries in arranging surrogacy, and the role of compensation in influencing decisionmaking.
For those who see surrogacy as intrinsically objectionable, nothing short of a total ban
will suffice. For those who object to the commodification of reproduction or to the role of
for-profit agencies in recruiting surrogates, however, the solutions lie in regulation rather
than prohibition. Commercial agencies, unlike infertile couples who enter into arrangements
with their friends and relatives, are repeat players. They are in a better position to
institutionalize appropriate practices and instantiate acceptable norms than are parties driven
by the desire to produce a child.
We conclude that much of the objection to commercial surrogacy involves the practice’s
growing pains. In the end, commercial agencies, particularly if they are subject to regulations
that require transparency and provide oversight, may promote human dignity as well as, or
better than, individually negotiated altruistic arrangements.

INTRODUCTION
The surrogacy 1 debate often conflates what should be seen as three
distinct issues: the permissibility of the practice under any
circumstances, the role of for-profit intermediaries in arranging
surrogacy, and the role of compensation in influencing decision-making.
While some find surrogacy intrinsically objectionable, most are troubled
instead by reproductive commodification and the role of for-profit
∗ Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law School.
∗∗ Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1. Surrogacy refers to the practice whereby a woman gives birth to a child with the intention that
the child will be raised by someone else. Modern assisted reproduction technology (ART) makes
two different types of surrogacy possible. With “traditional surrogacy,” artificial insemination is
used to fertilize the egg inside the woman’s body with the intended father’s sperm. In these cases,
the surrogate mother is the genetic and the gestational mother to the resulting child. With gestational
surrogacy, doctors fertilize an egg either from the intended mother or from a donor with a man’s
sperm and implant the fertilized egg in the womb of a woman who gives birth to the child. In these
cases, the gestational surrogate has a “biological” relationship to the child through gestation, but no
genetic tie to the child. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial
Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1260 (2013).
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agencies in arranging the practice. We contend that much of the
objection to commercial surrogacy is a response to the practice’s
growing pains. Any new technology, particularly one as controversial as
surrogacy, involves the creation of new procedures and appropriate
norms. Commercial agencies, unlike infertile couples who arrange for
the use of sisters or friends to give birth to their children, are repeat
players. Thus, they are more likely to routinize the practice; provide
screening; shape the parties’ understandings; and, for all intents and
purposes, fix prices. In the end, commercial agencies may promote
human dignity as well as, or better than, individually negotiated altruistic
arrangements. Accordingly, we maintain that prohibitions on payment
obstruct, rather than enhance, the development of socially acceptable
surrogacy arrangements.
In this Essay, we examine the relationship between the development
of surrogacy and the commercialization of assisted reproduction. First,
we review the intrinsic objections to surrogacy and show that they are
strongest in the context of “traditional surrogacy,” where the surrogate
mother gives birth to her genetic child for transfer to another. Second,
we discuss the objections to “gestational surrogacy,” where the woman
who gives birth is bearing a child to whom she is not genetically related,
and demonstrate that the most forceful of these objections do not involve
intrinsic objections to surrogacy itself. Rather, these objections implicate
the process of commodification. Third, we maintain that the criticisms of
commodification that involve fears of exploitation apply to altruistic as
well as commercial surrogacy. Finally, we conclude that for-profit
agencies, if administered with transparency and accountability,
contribute to the development of an appropriate ethical infrastructure for
surrogacy decision-making to a greater degree than exclusive reliance on
altruistic transactions.
I.

THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TRADITIONAL AND
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY

Surrogacy—the practice of having a woman give birth to be raised by
another—has existed since antiquity. In the book of Genesis, Abraham’s
infertile wife, Sarah, persuaded her handmaid, Hagar, to give birth to
Abraham’s child, whom Abraham and Sarah raised as their own. 2
2. Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 116–117
(1997) (noting that Sarah persuaded Abraham to sleep with Hagar to produce the child. In addition,
Rachel, Jacob’s infertile wife, similarly arranged for her maid Bilhah to have a child that Jacob and
Rachel raised).
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Today, we would call that process “traditional surrogacy,” except that
the woman giving birth would become pregnant through artificial
insemination rather than intercourse. 3 Since the advent of in vitro
fertilization (IVF) in the 1970’s, however, a man’s sperm can fertilize a
woman’s egg outside the body and then be implanted into a second
woman who will ultimately give birth to the child. 4 This process, called
“gestational surrogacy,” allows a woman to give birth to a child to
whom she was not genetically related. 5
The separation of genetics and gestation gives rise to two different
types of objections to surrogacy. The first objection focuses on the
transfer from the mother to another family, and is criticized as “baby
selling.” 6 The second objection involves the use of the surrogate’s
gestational services to give birth, and is criticized as “womb rental.”7
Critics of traditional surrogacy combine both arguments. Those who
object to gestational surrogacy focus on the second objection. In this
section, we argue that the opposition to traditional surrogacy tends to be
a wholesale opposition to the practice in any form, but that the criticisms
of gestational surrogacy are more likely to concern specific practices that
are not necessarily intrinsic to surrogacy itself.
Surrogacy first captured popular attention in the late 1980’s with the
birth of Melissa Stern, the infamous “Baby M.” 8 In this much publicized
case, Herbert Stern, the only child of Holocaust survivors, was married
to Elizabeth Stern, a doctor who suffered from multiple sclerosis and
who feared that pregnancy would worsen her condition. 9 Mr. Stern,
determined to have a biologically-related child, entered into a contract
with Mary Beth Whitehead to bear a child for him. 10 Whitehead would
be the genetic and gestational mother of the child. According to the New

3. Amanda Mechell Holliday, Who’s Your Daddy (and Mommy)? Creating Certainty for Texas
Couples Entering Into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2003).
4. Id. at 1103.
5. Id. at 1102–1103.
6. See generally Nancy M. Machinton, Surrogate Motherhood: Boon or Baby Selling? The
Unresolved Questions, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 115 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Melody Chen, Wombs for Rent: An Examination of Prohibitory and Regulatory
Approaches to Government Preconception Arrangements, 23 HEALTH LAW IN CAN. 33 (2003); Julie
Bindel, Commercial Surrogacy is a Rigged Market in Wombs for Rent, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 20,
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/20/commercial-surrogacy-wombs-rentsame-sex-pregnancy.
8. Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 112–13 (2009).
9. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
10. Id.
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Jersey Supreme Court, she would also be the child’s legal mother. 11
Baby M touched off a firestorm of publicity and condemnation.
Criticisms combined two concerns: the specter of “baby selling” (a
mother being paid to create to create a child for another)12 and fear of
exploitation (a belief that a mother would do this only because money
overcame more sensible judgments). 13 The two concerns were related.
During this time, IVF was in its infancy. Surrogates, who were
artificially inseminated with the intended father’s sperm, provided both
the egg and the womb.
More than twenty-five years after Baby M, surrogacy remains
controversial. A minority of commentators objects to surrogacy
altogether, some would permit it in limited circumstances (allowing, for
example, the use of a gestational carrier to give birth to the genetic child
of a woman born without a womb), and still others would leave the
matter entirely to individual choice.14 For those who find surrogacy or
particular surrogacy-related practices intrinsically objectionable, the
only solution is a ban on the offensive practices, whether or not the
surrogate is paid. Yet, the effect of gestational surrogacy has been to
separate the arguments against all surrogacy from those opposed to
traditional surrogacy per se.
Conceiving a child and carrying it to term is an act of creation and
profound psychological bonding. Many view reproduction as an act of
wonder; religions view it as sacred. Moreover, for most women,
pregnancy involves an adjustment to the idea of motherhood. Over the
course of the pregnancy, hormonal fluctuations produce intense mood
swings and most women experience an intensifying identification with
their child as they work through the cascade of pregnancy-related
emotions. Pregnancy gives prospective mothers a chance to prepare for
the birth, and most behold the children they produce with awe and joy.
Accordingly, while all pregnant women experience physical and
emotional changes, traditional surrogacy asked a mother to surrender her
child immediately after birth, where a new mother is ordinarily expected
to feel an extraordinarily intense identification with the child she has

11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Margaret Jane Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 PAC.
L.J. 135, 144–45 (1995).
13. See Iver Peterson, Baby M, Ethics and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/18/nyregion/baby-m-ethics-and-the-law.html (“To some who
have studied the issue one of the most disturbing elements of surrogate motherhood is the overtone
of class exploitation.”).
14. See infra notes 15–23.
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Some religious and secular philosophers maintain that surrogacy is
intrinsically impermissible whether compensated or not. The Catholic
Church’s modern theology of the body, for example, associates the
divine—and human dignity—with the conception of a child within a
woman’s body as a result of intercourse, celebrating the unity of sex,
marriage, and procreation as part of God’s plan.16 Accordingly, the
Church objects not only to surrogacy, compensated or unpaid, but to IVF
altogether. 17 Secular philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, maintain that
human beings should always be seen as ends in themselves, not means to
an end. 18 Religious and secular traditions disfavor the creation of a child
for a reason other than the desire for the child itself. Surrogacy involves
conception not for the child’s sake or as the natural outcome of sexual
intercourse, but for other reasons. Payment compounds the offense, but
the same objection would apply if the mother’s motive were to please a
third party. The child becomes a means by which the mother achieves
ends that may not necessarily involve the child at all. Even if the mother
has confidence in the prospective parents’ love and ability to provide for
the child, she still has given birth to a human being who would not exist
but for payment or for the mother’s sense of obligation to another. In
accordance with this line of thinking, traditional surrogacy is necessarily
objectionable because the mother creates the child for another.
15. See, e.g., Brief of Organizations Committed to Women’s Equality as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 9, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S.
320 (2006) (No. 04-1144) (“While the lasting impact of bearing a child could be mitigated by
surrendering the child to others to raise, in reality, fewer than one percent of children born to nevermarried women are placed for adoption. . . . This likely reflects the psychological toll of giving up
a child at birth.”).
16. See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Services 24 (5th ed. 2009), available at http://www.ncbcenter.org/
document.doc?id=147 (“Reproductive technologies that substitute for the marriage act are not
consistent with human dignity. Just as the marriage act is joined naturally to procreation, so
procreation is joined naturally to the marriage act.”).
17. See, e.g., Donum Vitae, available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/
cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html (determining both
heterologous and homologous artificial fertilization to be unacceptable); John M. Haas, Begotten
Not Made: A Catholic View of Reproductive Technology, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/reproductive-technology
/begotten-not-made-a-catholic-view-of-reproductive-technology.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2015)
(“One reproductive technology which the Church has clearly and unequivocally judged to be
immoral is in vitro fertilization or IVF.”).
18. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 186–87 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 73
(2000) (stating that the Kantian notion of dignity requires recognizing “each person [as] a bearer of
value” and views exploitation as treating “a person as a mere object for the use of others.”).
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By contrast, philosophers disagree about gestational surrogacy, which
involves appropriation of the surrogate’s labor without use of her genetic
material. Thus, it does not include her involvement in the child’s
conception. 19 Exacerbating the more abstract concerns is the mother’s
relinquishment of the child to the prospective parents. 20 Cultural mores
stress that a mother is supposed to experience a profound connection to
her newborn, and that giving up that child should be wrenching.
Handing over a child is a form of abandonment, even betrayal.
Accordingly, surrogacy, to the extent it involves the deliberate creation
of a child for another, victimizes both the mother who surrenders a child
and that child, who may wonder why her mother intentionally gave her
up. 21 While gestation itself creates a sense of attachment to the child
(and some will also object to gestational surrogacy on this ground), the
normative conclusion that the traditional surrogate should identify and
bond with the child is reinforced by the sense that the child is
intrinsically and uniquely “hers.”
Complementing the harm to the mother is the emotional dissonance
authorities may feel in enforcing surrogacy agreements when they go
awry. Mary Beth Whitehead fled, for example, rather than surrender the
child to the Sterns. 22 When the police eventually confronted her, they
forcibly took the baby and returned it to the Sterns. 23 Enforcing
surrogacy contracts, as in Baby M, may require literally taking a baby
from its mother’s arms. The prospect is disturbing not only because of
the potential impact on mother and child, but also because it involves
state intervention to sever a maternal connection.
At the time of Baby M and afterwards, others have argued that women
were fully capable of making surrogacy arrangements. 24 Women, like
men who have one-night stands or donate to a sperm bank, should be
able to decide to create a child they will not raise. Responsible women
who elect to enter into surrogacy contracts may want assurances that
new parents will adequately provide for the child, but they should not be
19. For a definition of gestational surrogacy, see supra note 5 and accompanying text. For
discussion of the ethical distinctions between traditional and gestational surrogacy as they relate to
the meaning of motherhood, see infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Surrogates Could Make Pregnancy a Service Industry, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1986, at B5 (“I do not believe that anyone should be able to sign away parental
rights before she has even borne the child. A baby is not a piece of goods, and human emotions do
not make for neat contracts.”).
21. For a summary of these arguments, see Scott, supra note 8, at 112.
22. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
23. Id. at 1236—37.
24. See Iver Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987, at B2.
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subject to motherhood ideals that assume that all women identify with
all of their genetic offspring in particular ways. Just as some object to
state intervention in taking a newborn away from its mother, so do
others object to state intervention that limits reproductive choices.25
These individuals argue that no option, including reproductive
surrogacy, should be taken off the table. 26
However, these arguments, which address women’s decision-making
capacity, do not respond to arguments rooted in the personhood of the
child. 27 The latter arguments involve societal judgments about the
identity of parenthood, and traditional surrogacy involves production of
a child who, in every sense but parental intent, is the child of the
traditional surrogate. The appropriate response to objections that
surrogacy intrinsically dehumanizes the child is to ban traditional
surrogacy altogether or to limit it to narrow circumstances where the
birth mother’s genetic tie to the child is important in itself.28
II.

GESTATIONAL SURROGATES AND THE PROSPECT OF
EXPLOITATION

The development of gestational surrogacy fundamentally changed the
nature of the surrogacy debate. A substantial basis for the objections to
surrogacy in Baby M focused on the ties between the child and a mother
who both supplies an egg and gives birth. 29 In contrast, objections to
gestational surrogacy depend less on the mother-child tie and more on
the potential for abuse of the relationship between the intended parents
and the carrier. 30 This section will focus on three types of objections:
first, the degree to which use of a woman’s reproductive capacity for
another can be reconciled with notions of human dignity; second, the
25. See, e.g., Calvert v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (“The argument that a woman
cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries
overtones of the reasoning that for centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights
and professional status under the law.”).
26. See, e.g., Lorraine Sorrel, Baby M Again, OFF OUR BACKS, July 31, 1987, at 26.
27. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1928–36 (1987)
(discussing how commodification affects personhood).
28. The most typical cases will involve sisters or other relatives who share a genetic link with the
intended mother. There is, however, another set of concerns tied to the woman’s health. Artificial
insemination is, after all, a relatively non-intrusive process. Use of in vitro fertilization, on the other
hand, is necessary for a woman to give birth to another woman’s child and it involves far more risk
to the gestational carrier. See discussion infra, p. 11.
29. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
30. See Michelle Ford, Gestational Surrogacy Is not Adultery: Fighting Against Religious
Opposition to Procreate, 10 BARRY L. REV. 81, 98–99 (2008).
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gestational carrier’s decision-making capacity in light of the
physiological and psychological impact of pregnancy; and third, the
acceptability of the health risks to the carrier.
The fundamental difference between traditional and gestational
surrogacy is that the woman who gives birth is not the child’s genetic
parent. IVF, which creates the ability to fertilize a woman’s eggs outside
the body and transfer the developing embryos into another woman, 31
makes it possible to separate the gestational and genetic aspects of
parenthood. It also raises a question that women have never had to face
before: what makes a person a mother?
Law professor Gary Spitko advances a “labor theory” of parenthood
that would treat the gestational mother as the initial legal parent,
regardless of the circumstances of conception. 32 His theory recognizes a
second legal parent (including a genetic father) only with the gestational
mother’s consent. 33 Accordingly, gestational and traditional surrogates
would be treated as legal parents absent their post-birth consent to
adoption. Some state laws are in accord with this theory, recognizing the
woman who gives birth as a legal parent on the basis of her gestational
role. 34 Other states, however, even if they would ordinarily regard the
gestational mother as a legal parent, permit a pre-conception judicial
proceeding (with adoption-like safeguards) to secure the intended
parents’ legal parentage at birth. 35
The majority of states reject the privileging of gestation over the
genetic connection. These states stress intent to parent the child as the
most important factor, and refuse to accord surrogates a parental status
equivalent to the infertile couple. In the first major gestational surrogacy
decision, Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court ruled
explicitly that intent was the tie breaker between two women who each
had a biological tie to the child. 36 In that case, Christina Calvert was

31. See In vitro fertilization (IVF) Definition, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/in-vitro-fertilization/basics/definition/prc-20018905 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
32. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the
Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 97 (2006).
33. Id. at 104.
34. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 23, 24 (2000) (“It is apparent from the
foregoing cases that a ‘gestational mother’ may possess enforceable rights under the law, despite her
being a ‘genetic stranger’ to the child.”).
35. See Brock A. Patton, Buying a Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of Federal Regulation
of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 518–20 (2010) (summarizing state
laws).
36. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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unable to carry a child to term, and Anna Johnson agreed to give birth to
a child conceived with Christina’s egg and her husband’s sperm. When
Johnson contested parentage after the child’s birth, the court ruled that,
under California’s version of the Uniform Parentage Act, both the
genetic mother and the gestational carrier could be recognized as
parents. Rather than privilege either genetics or gestation, the court held
that intent plus either genetics or gestation determined parentage. 37 It
accordingly recognized Calvert as the legal mother. 38
Since Johnson v. Calvert, the majority of gestational surrogacy cases
have deferred to the parties’ intent. 39 The principal statutory exceptions
have come from states that would either discourage surrogacy 40 or
recognize the woman giving birth as the mother. 41 The latter encourage
use of judicial process to determine parenthood. 42 Even then, state courts
in Utah and Florida have held such statutes unconstitutional to the extent
they preclude legal recognition of a genetic parent using a gestational
carrier with the intention of retaining her parental status. 43 Whether or
not these cases produce ironclad constitutional guarantees, the weight of
authority favors consideration of the combination of intent and genetics
over gestation alone. Thus, the labor theory, in its pure form, has not
been credited in most jurisdictions.
The conclusion that the child belongs to the intended parents frames
the objections to and the defenses of gestational surrogacy. The first
concern is that the intended parents are using another person, not as an
equal partner in their efforts to create a child, but as a means to an end.
They are thus appropriating the fruits of the gestational carrier’s labor,

37. Id. at 782.
38. Id. (“We conclude that although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving
birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide
in one woman, she who intended to . . . bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
her own—is the natural mother under California law.”).
39. See Scott, supra note 8, at 110 n.11. See also Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An
Empirical Analysis of the Use of the Intent Test to Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive
Technology Cases, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2013) (observing that courts generally defer to
intent in cases involving assisted reproduction).
40. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857 (West 2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ANN.
§ 123 (McKinney 2013).
41. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001 & Supp. 2012).
42. Id. See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.755 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (requiring judicial
proceeding); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-803 (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A)(B)
(2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16, B:20, B:22-23 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008).
43. J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1296 (D. Utah 2002); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320
(Fla. 2013) (invalidating refusal to recognize genetic mother as legal parent to child born to her
same-sex partner).
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without crediting her investment in the child’s birth. 44 Payment increases
the concern. A friend or relative might enter into a surrogacy
arrangement as an equal in a relationship of mutual respect. Intended
parents, on the other hand, are more likely to reduce a commercial
surrogate’s contribution to the price of the contract.
In fact, surveys of commercial surrogacy in the United States belie the
claim that gestational carriers feel that surrogacy arrangements are
intrinsically unfair or demeaning. These surveys indicate that gestational
carriers are motivated at least in part by the desire to help others to
conceive. 45 While carriers might not agree to undertake pregnancy’s
considerable inconvenience and expense absent payment, the desire to
help others is an important consideration. 46 The gestational carrier and
intended parents are often united in their concern for the child and their
joy in the process of conception. 47 Moreover, gestational carriers find
that the knowledge that the child they are carrying is that of the intended
couple, rather than their own child, strengthens their willingness to
participate in the process. 48 While gestational carriers can experience
unfair, insensitive, or dehumanizing treatment, they largely report
satisfaction with the experience in the United States. 49 Within the
American context at least, those who become gestational carriers often
choose to participate in the surrogacy process because they enjoy the
experience of pregnancy, rather than find it intrusive or demeaning. 50
The second objection to gestational surrogacy concerns the question
of whether it is ever appropriate to ask a woman to relinquish the child
to whom she has just given birth because of the attachment that arises
during pregnancy. With traditional surrogacy, the issue involved the
44. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71,
75 (1990) (arguing that when women’s capacity to carry children “is treated as a commodity, the
women who perform it are degraded.”).
45. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1242.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Scott, supra note 8, at 142; see also ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE
SURROGATE BODY AND THE PREGNANT SELF 31–68 (2010) (stating that in-depth interviews with
gestational surrogates found that they strongly regard the fetus as the child of the intended parents);
Hal B. Levine, Gestational Surrogacy: Nature and Culture in Kinship, 42 ETHNOLOGY 179
(Summer 2003).
49. Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of
Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 31–32 (2005) (finding that most
surrogates reported satisfaction with the experience).
50. International surrogacy, however, may involve greater potential for abuse. See Katarina
Trimmings & Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Legal
Regulation at the International Level, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L LAW 632–33 (2011).
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propriety of the mother’s willingness to give up her own child. With
gestational surrogacy, the issue is her capacity to do so in light of the
emotional attachment that typically attends pregnancy and childbirth.
The assumption is that if pregnancy naturally or inevitably produces
such feelings, a woman giving birth will naturally and inevitably
experience anguish or regret at relinquishing the child. Asking her to do
so in advance, before she has actually experienced the emotions
involved, is therefore a form of exploitation. 51 Others feel that women
(particularly if they have given birth before) can “control” their
emotions, and that they are more likely to do so where they believe they
are conferring a gift upon another couple, whom they regard as the
child’s true parents. 52 In gestational surrogacy, arguments about
women’s autonomy and decision-making capacity involve their ability to
deal with their own emotions in making an ethically acceptable decision.
Empirical studies find, in fact, that gestational carriers do not typically
have difficulty relinquishing the child. 53
A third concern involves the inherent risks of pregnancy and
childbirth. This concern gives rise to contentions that asking a woman to
undergo such risks for another is a form of exploitation. Even today, a
small number of women die in childbirth, even with the best medical
care. 54 Others suffer lifelong side effects from a difficult birth,
postpartum medical treatment, postpartum depression, or pregnancyrelated hormonal changes. 55 The mandatory use of IVF in gestational
51. See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV.
345, 356—57 (2011) (indicating that separating from the child is difficult, but not necessarily
traumatic).
52. Indeed, empirical studies show that gestational carriers have stronger feelings of emotional
attachment to the prospective parents than the child. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1230–31.
53. See Olga van den Akker, Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience
of Surrogacy, 21 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 145, 147 (2003) (noting that some traditional
surrogates reported problems relinquishing the child but most did not, and none of the gestational
surrogates did). Ironically, some indicate that payment may discourage maternal-fetal attachment
during pregnancy. See Hazel Baslington, The Social Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a
Baby and the Role of Payment in the Psychological Detachment Process, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL 57
(2002).
54. See MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH
USA
2008–2009
24
(2009),
available
at
http://
CHILD
mchb.hrsa.gov/publications/pdfs/childhealth200809.pdf; JIAQUAN XU ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2007, 58 Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep. May 20, 2010,
at 13, available at http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf (noting that twelve tofifteen
women die in childbirth for every 100,000 births).
55. See, e.g., CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, VAGINAL BIRTH AND CESAREAN BIRTH: HOW DO THE
RISKS
COMPARE?
(2006),
available
at
http://www.pqcnc.org/documents/sivbdoc/
sivbeb/8ChildbirthConnectionVaginalBirthandCesareanBirthRiskComparison.pdf (describing the
risks that are distinct to vaginal births); Cesarean Procedure Risks, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
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surrogacy also increases risks as a gestational carrier must take various
hormones to prepare her body for the embryo. 56 Ethicists question
whether prospective surrogates can fully assess these risks, which are
hard to determine in advance, and whether these tradeoffs are ethically
permissible. That is, while many would accept intended parents’
willingness to take physical and financial risks to have a genetically
related child, more would question the tradeoffs involved in gestational
surrogacy. The gestational carrier is risking her own health and wellbeing to create a child for someone else—typically for payment. The
tradeoff between potential health risks and payment is arguably
impermissible either because another person (the gestational carrier) is
used as a means to an end, 57 or because of doubt that her consent can
ever be truly informed and free of the coercion that comes with payment.
The response to these objections concerning decision-making
competency and emotional and physical exploitation depends in part on
surrogacy’s perceived value. The ability to assist prospective parents to
have a genetically related child is itself incalculable. 58 Accordingly, if
intended parents can ethically undertake risks of a surrogate pregnancy,
why can’t a gestational carrier, motivated at least in part by altruistic
concern for the intended parents or child? The question becomes one of
informed consent rather than intrinsic objection.
Moreover, payment influences gestational carriers’ decisions in varied
ways. A given fee, such as the $10,000 paid to Mary Beth Whitehead
(more like $20,000 to $25,000 today), 59 will mean something different to
each surrogate depending on the surrogate’s socioeconomic status. 60
Similarly, women vary in their ability to weigh risks and make informed
http://americanpregnancy.org/labor-and-birth/cesarean-risks/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (finding
that greater risks are associated with Cesarean procedures); NICETTE JUKELEVICS, UNDERSTANDING
THE DANGERS OF CESAREAN BIRTH: MAKING INFORMED DECISIONS 60–65 (2008) (discussing
depression and other maternal risks).
56. See, e.g., ASRM Patient Fact Sheet: Risks of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), AM. SOC’Y FOR
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, http://www.asrm.org/FACTSHEET_Risks_of_In_Vitro_Fertilization/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
57. See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 222 (2009) (“We potentially do harm to ourselves and to human
flourishing if we treat something integral to ourselves as a commodity, i.e., as separate and
fungible.”).
58. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1224–25.
59. Id. at 1264 n.244 (noting that the typical fee today is between $20,000 and $25,000).
60. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing
the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–91 (2003); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1,
at 1234 (noting that most surrogates are working class; they need the money but are not poor or
desperate).
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choices depending on the quality and quantity of information they
receive and their individual capacity to evaluate that information. 61
Taken together, arguments about gestational surrogacy’s
permissibility are far more contextual than objections to traditional
surrogacy. At the core of these arguments is concern about contract
structure and payment’s role in skewing surrogacy decision-making. The
next section will address the role of commercial, for-profit agencies in
structuring that decision-making.
III. COMMERCIALIZATION VERSUS ALTRUISM, AND THE
IMPACT OF SURROGACY AGENCIES
Critics of commodification contrast altruistic and commercial
motivations and associate the potential abuse of gestational carriers with
the profit motive. Yet, studies of surrogacy in practice find that many of
these abuses also occur in altruistic cases. The problems are indicative of
surrogacy’s growing pains. Creating norms that regularize a new
practice, establish ethical standards, and shape parties’ expectations
takes time and experience. In this section, we contrast the role of
commercial agencies with private arrangements in shaping such
understandings and identify specific agency practices that contribute to
forging an ethical infrastructure for surrogacy agreements. Surrogates’
motives and the involvement of a surrogacy agency can profoundly
affect the formation and outcome of a surrogacy arrangement.
Consider the case of two gay men, Donald Robinson and Sean
Hollingsworth, a married couple who wanted to have a child they would
raise together. Donald’s sister, Angelia, a childless unmarried woman in
her forties, agreed to serve as a gestational carrier. 62 As part of the
agreement, she left her Texas home and went to work for her brother’s
Manhattan accounting firm. She conceived twins and planned to live
permanently near her brother in New Jersey and play a role in the
children’s lives.
All did not go well. Over the course of the pregnancy, Angelia began
to bond with the twins, and she and her brother eventually had a fallingout. 63 The pregnancy was difficult; Angelia experienced periodic
depression and nearly died one month before the due date when her
61. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1249–50.
62. Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, With a Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?pagewanted=all.
63. Courtney Crandell, Egg Fight, WORLD, Jan. 11, 2013, http://www.worldmag.com/
2013/01/egg_fight.
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blood pressure spiked due to pre-eclampsia. Although her brother and
his partner took the children home from the hospital, Angelia sued for
recognition as their legal mother. As part of the Baby M legacy, New
Jersey does not recognize the validity of surrogacy agreements and,
absent adoption, treats the woman who gives birth as the legal mother,
even without a genetic relationship. 64 The courts concluded that Angelia
was the children’s legal mother, and Sean Hollingsworth (as sperm
provider) was the legal father. Sean received full legal and physical
custody, but Angelia was awarded visitation. Five years after the
children’s birth, the parties, who agreed on little, were still disputing
care issues. 65
Angelia’s case illustrates why those who find surrogacy intrinsically
objectionable think it is sensible to ban it outright. The case also
embodies the tradeoffs faced by those who do not uniformly oppose
surrogacy but fear commercial surrogacy will lead to exploitative,
demeaning, or unfair practices. Critics from both perspectives could
allege exploitation irrespective of payment. However, exploitation is not
inherent within all surrogacy arrangements. If a state takes Washington’s
approach of allowing altruistic surrogacy—permitting surrogacy but
banning payment—the state discourages the practice’s growth in-state
and encourages its residents to rely on informal or out-of-state surrogacy
arrangements, with little ability to shape the practices. If states legalize
surrogacy with payment, state regulation and private institutionalization
of surrogacy norms may regularize surrogacy relationships and provide
participants some protection. For reasons discussed below, no reputable
agency today would arrange a surrogacy agreement on the terms Donald
and Angelia reached. 66
In Baby M, many observers disapproved of the commercial entities
involved as much, if not more, than surrogacy itself. 67 There, conflict
appeared inevitable and the agency’s role in setting up the transaction in
spite of the warning signs demonstrated the potentially unsavory nature
of commercial agencies. William Stern had gone to much trouble to
conceive a genetically related child to ensure continuation of a family
line threatened with extermination during the Holocaust. The agency’s
64. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *9–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Dec. 23, 2009).
65. Ted Sherman, N.J. Gay Couple Fight for Custody of Twin 5-Year-Old Girls, NJ.COM (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/12/nj_gay_couple_fight_for_custod.html.
66. See discussion infra at pp. 15–18.
67. See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1987, at B1.
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pre-conception psychological screening indicated that Mary Beth
Whitehead would have difficulty giving up the child, yet the agency still
proceeded to use her as a surrogate.68 Under these circumstances, both
Stern and Whitehead could be expected to bond with the child, yet the
agency did not provide either with counseling or assistance after the
birth. Banning commercial surrogacy served to eliminate the prospect
that profit-motivated agencies would rush to arrange questionable
transactions. These bans still allowed parties in need of surrogacy
services to canvass family and friends for someone presumably more
trustworthy than Mary Beth Whitehead. Yet, there is reason to doubt that
altruistic transactions are necessarily happier or less conflicted, or that
state bans will necessarily restrain the growth of commercial surrogacy
exchanges.
Every state has residents unable to reproduce without gestational
surrogacy. To produce a genetically related child in Washington today,
these residents have three options. First, they can hire a surrogate out-ofstate. California, which has legalized surrogacy and recognizes intended
parents on the child’s birth certificate without an adoption proceeding,
has a flourishing surrogacy industry attracting prospective parents from
around the world. 69 In addition, international fertility tourism now offers
less expensive options. 70 Shopping for surrogacy-friendly jurisdictions
has become a global business. Accordingly, it is unlikely bans on
payment will stem its growth. Second, residents can try to enter into
their own underground surrogacy agreements, advertising online or
responding to others’ ads. These informal relationships, however, leave
both parties with fewer protections than they would have through
authorized transactions. Third, Washington residents interested in
surrogacy can try to persuade a friend or family member to give birth
without payment—as in Angelia’s case. Though these cases sometimes
lead to happy conclusions and closer family ties, they can also be
exploitative in some of the same ways as commercial surrogacy.
Commercial agencies, in contrast, offer protections that may not have
been available at the time of Baby M. They have developed policies
designed to prevent the conflicts that arose in the Baby M case and
between Angelia and Donald. In the first place, no reputable agency
68. Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 67, 90 (2007).
69. Id. at 96.
70. See, e.g., Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2272 (2012) (observing that the cost of surrogacy is
significantly less expensive in India than it is in the United States).
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would choose a gestational carrier like Angelia, who was childless and
in her forties. Agencies prefer women who have already given birth,
partly because it indicates that a carrier can deliver a child without
complications, and partly because it provides assurance that she
“understands the biological and emotional implications of pregnancy and
childbirth.” 71 In an interview discussing the case, the New York Times
quoted Dr. James Goldfarb of the Cleveland Clinic, who indicated
standard clinical practice when he commented that “[i]f a surrogate has
not had a baby before, we won’t use her.” 72 In contrast, parties
dependent on altruistic surrogacy may know relatively few women
willing to be gestational carriers, and may not have the luxury of looking
for more suitable candidates.
Moreover, arm’s length practices provide a measure of protection for
both intended parents and surrogates. The fertility clinic involved in the
Robinson case had offered psychological screening, but the parties
refused; 73 if the surrogate were a stranger, the clinic would have been
more likely to have insisted on the screening and the intended parents
would have been more likely to accept. 74 Angelia felt pressure from her
brother to agree, and the lack of options may have heightened the
pressure on both parties to proceed. 75 In addition, the brother and sister
entered into arrangements that strangers in a contractual relationship are
unlikely to do: Angelia sold her Texas home where she had lived all her
life, accepted a job with Donald’s firm in New York, used her own
assets and some of her brother’s to set up a bed and breakfast, and
became dependent on him financially. 76 After the birth—and the rupture
in her relationship with her brother—she had no home, no savings, no
job, and no access to the children she had planned to help raise. She
responded by rediscovering her Baptist faith and denouncing both
surrogacy and homosexuality, complicating the relationship with her
brother and his spouse. 77
71. See Saul, supra note 62. They also prefer gestational carriers who, unlike Mary Beth
Whitehead, have no genetic tie to the child. See also Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1260 (noting
that more than ninety-five percent of surrogates carry children to whom they are not genetically
related).
72. See Saul, supra note 62.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1262 (noting that psychological screening is matter
of common practice even where not mandated by state law).
75. Harold Cassidy, The Surrogate Uterus: The AGR Case and Melissa Brisman, PUBLIC
DISCOURSE, (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/09/6216/.
76. Id.
77. Crandell, supra note 63.
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By contrast, agencies often structure the relationship to separate
surrogacy’s commercial and altruistic parts. Agencies typically require
that the intended parties make payments in advance. The agency then
distributes the payments to the surrogate when required conditions have
been met. 78 In addition, agencies may insist that the surrogate have
separate legal representation to increase chances a contract will be
enforced; Angelia instead waived the right to separate counsel. 79 Even if
the contract is of questionable enforceability, independent counsel may
review matters such as the agreement’s binding force (void in New
Jersey), the parties’ plans for an abortion from birth defects or other
contingencies, the need for an adoption to transfer legal parentage, the
carrier’s ability to change her mind post-birth (an uncertain matter in
New Jersey at that time), and any anticipated post-birth contact with the
child. Angelia’s lawyer reported that she moved to New Jersey in part to
have a continuing relationship with the children, but she signed an
agreement that severed her parental status and made access to the
children dependent on her brother and his spouse’s goodwill. As brother
and sister, Donald and Angelia had expectations that Angelia’s
involvement with the twins would continue, but these expectations, at
least on Angelia’s part, may well have gone beyond the conventional
role of an “aunt.” Thorough exploration of the agreement and the
parties’ post-birth expectations might have persuaded them that this
sister-as-surrogate arrangement was not a good idea, or could have
produced more realistic plans and expectations.
Moreover, processes of socialization may allow parties to surrogacy
arrangements to traverse well-trodden paths instead of hacking their own
way haphazardly through the experience. Many of the practices
surrounding pregnancy, marriage, and childbirth have been
“institutionalized” in that social norms define parties’ expected behavior
within the institutions of marriage and legal parenthood. 80 Andrew
Cherlin, for example, has argued that marriage once served to socialize
young people into adulthood through the assumption of predictable,
gendered roles. 81 Remarriage, the stepparent role, and same-sex
relationships did not have the same “institutionalization” function
78. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (noting in that case that the
surrogate was paid in installments over the course of the pregnancy, with the final installment
scheduled for six weeks after birth).
79. Cassidy, supra note 75.
80. See, e.g., Andrew Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 848 (2004).
81. Id. at 848–849.
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because role expectations were far less detailed or uniform. 82
The relationship between Sean, Donald, and Angelia was not
“institutionalized” in any sense. It is not too much of a stretch to say that
their collaborative reproduction plan required making it up as they went
along. Both surrogate and same-sex reproduction, after all, are relatively
new. Over the time period from the twins’ conception to the custody
resolution five years post-birth, Sean and Donald went from a
relationship that could not receive legal recognition in most states, to
marriage in California, to repeal of the right to marry (that nonetheless
did not invalidate their particular union), to recognition of their
California marriage in New York (where Donald and Angelia worked
but not in New Jersey where they lived). The legal status of gestational
surrogacy and the parties’ subsequent parental status also shifted during
the same time period—neither New York nor New Jersey adopted
comprehensive legislation addressing the issue. 83 As a result, the
litigation between the parties addressed issues that had not been resolved
under New Jersey law at the time the parties entered into their initial
agreement. 84
If surrogacy becomes common, particularly for gay couples, its
associated roles may become more routinized and, with shared
expectations, more institutionalized. This is more likely to happen,
however, if commercial agencies play a role in the process. After all, a
quarter century after Baby M, the agencies, which were in their infancy
at the time of the case, largely responded by moving out of New
Jersey. 85 The question for the future is what role payment—and
attorneys and commercial agencies—plays in the creation of appropriate
ethical understandings for the development of new forms of
reproduction.
IV. REPEAT PLAYERS, COMMERCIAL AGENCIES, AND
ETHICAL CODES
Ethical codes—and the institutionalization of family norms—come
from the formalization of shared experiences. For that to happen,
82. Id. at 848.
83. Scott, supra note 8, at 120.
84. See generally, A.G.R. v. D.R.H., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
85. See Lawrence Van Gelder, Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, is Dead,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/28/nyregion/noel-keane-58-lawyer-insurrogate-mother-cases-is-dead.html (stating that Keane, the lawyer who arranged the Baby M
surrogacy, maintained offices elsewhere, such as in Indianapolis, Indiana).
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practices need to be visible and opinion leaders such as legislators,
courts, religious figures, and professionals need to shape and fix in place
appropriate understandings. Repeat players in surrogacy arrangements
can anticipate what can and will go wrong and design procedures
accordingly. Some arrangements that may feel appropriate in a conflictfree relationship will appear unfair or even exploitative in the event of a
dispute. Donald’s willingness to provide Angelia with a job and help to
establish her bed and breakfast seems well-meaning, even generous, in
the context of a collaborative brother-sister relationship, but oppressive
in encouraging Angelia to become financially dependent and therefore
vulnerable. In this section, we argue that commercial agencies, subject to
appropriate regulation and oversight, are more likely to protect the
parties involved in a surrogacy arrangement than laws that restrict
surrogacy to altruistic exchanges.
Commercial surrogacy agencies, through their broker role, may “lock
in” practices that help surrogacy operate more smoothly, particularly in
jurisdictions without comprehensive regulation. This does not always
mean that agencies adopt best practices or that they act against selfinterest. Instead, it simply means that the presence of commercial actors
in the surrogacy process changes the dynamic in predictable ways. We
discuss four of those ways below.
First, agencies alter supply and demand. Donald and Angelia may
have each felt pressure to reach an agreement if both believed it was the
only way for Donald to have a child with his partner. An agency
recruiting many possible gestational carriers would have increased the
supply. Given other possible surrogates, Angelia may have felt freer to
press Donald about terms of their agreement, and Donald may have
thought twice about whether to use his sister. Alternatively, after
examining an arm’s length arrangement with another carrier, they may
have agreed on different terms or evolved a different understanding of
the arrangement.
Second, agencies act on the basis of past experience. Clinic practices
reflect institutional memory of past cases, particularly cases that go
wrong. Fertility clinics, surrogacy agencies, and lawyers tend to
incorporate lessons gleaned from past experiences into new procedures.
For example, in recruiting surrogates, agencies often require that
prospective gestational carriers be over twenty-one and under forty-one;
have no sexually transmitted diseases, cancer, substance abuse, or other
disqualifying medical conditions; be financially secure; have a
supportive environment; and be capable of handling pregnancy’s
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physical and emotional issues. 86 Many clinics also will not work with
carriers who have not given birth 87 and require psychological screening;
jurisdictions that regulate surrogacy often mandate such evaluations.88
These requirements explain much of what went wrong in Angelia
Robinson’s case. Her age may have increased her susceptibility to
pregnancy complications. Selling her house, quitting her job, and
moving to New Jersey made her financially vulnerable. Agencies rule
out those who are too financially desperate, which also tends to limit
claims of exploitation. 89 They also prefer gestational carriers who have
“a supportive environment,” which often means a significant other,
children, friends, and family on whom they can rely—apart from the
intended parents. Carriers who already have children not only know
what to expect, but are less likely to regard surrogacy as their only
opportunity to have a child, as Angelia did. These practices help select
surrogates who are more likely to surrender the child at birth—and limit
the potential that the surrogate will be exploited, treated unfairly, or
physically or emotionally endangered by the pregnancy.
Third, agencies assist parties in forming contracts and ensure
independent representation. Even in a state like New Jersey where
surrogacy contracts are unenforceable, working through an agreement
may help parties understand what they are likely to face and provide a
framework for future decisions. As one lawyer observed, “[t]he act of
setting down the intentions, expectations and goals of the parties will
diminish the chance of later conflict or disappointment.” 90
Courts, moreover, may be inclined to hold those who profit from
surrogacy arrangements to a duty to look out for the interests of both
parties. Two individuals—an attorney and a surrogacy broker—who had
arranged a surrogacy arrangement were held liable when the child was
born with severe birth defects that might have been prevented had the
father been properly screened. The court held: “This . . . affirmative duty
of protection, marked by heightened diligence, arises out of a special
relationship because the defendants engaged in the surrogacy business

86. Stephen L. Corson et al., Gestational Carrier Pregnancy, 69 FERTILITY & STERILITY 670,
671 (1998).
87. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 49, at 34.
88. See, e.g., Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q.
203, 216 (2008) (suggesting legislation that mandates psychological consultations).
89. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1264.
90. William S. Singer, Exploring New Terrain: Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), The
Law and Ethics, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 918, 928 (2011).
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and expected to profit thereby.” 91 Attorneys have a duty to design and
administer a program that would protect the participants from
foreseeable harm. 92 Federal and state regulation can also address health
and other standards 93 and, if appropriate, limit contractual waivers of
liability. The formalization and professionalization of the process means
that these professionals are likely to be held responsible for things that
go awry, providing incentives for anticipating—and avoiding—potential
sources of liability.
Of course, including lawyers and formal contracts also involves
opportunities for one-sided bargains. 94 Angelia Robinson did sign a
contract, albeit one that misstated her options under New Jersey law, and
did so without legal representation. Lawyers often encourage parties to
agree to provisions that may not be legally enforceable. Such provisions
are inappropriate where they mislead, but they may also create a
framework to deal with possible contingencies. For example, while no
court will enforce a provision compelling an abortion over the
gestational carrier’s objection, such a provision may encourage parties to
contemplate what to do if a fetus has birth defects. Some surrogacy
contracts, for example, now include provisions that provide for selective
reduction of multiples, but they may also limit the provision to higher
order multiples such as triplets. The objection to selective reduction of
twins may reflect agency preferences, emerging norms in the field, or a
desire to routinize a likely wrenching decision. Whatever the motivation,
the contract provisions helps shape expectations before the issue arises.
Routinizing the contract process requires attention to three distinct
circumstances: (a) where contracts are enforceable, separate
representation, particularly for the party with less bargaining power, is
critical; 95 (b) where provisions may not be enforceable, they still lock in
agreements about how to handle foreseeable problems, and they should
be based on complete and accurate information; and (c) where they
insulate commercial actors from liability, they should be subject to
scrutiny. Nonetheless, the inclusion of professional, experienced parties
who can realistically anticipate, explain, and plan for potential

91. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 268.
93. Lauren Gill, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context of Free, Private
Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1731–34 (2013) (reviewing health regulations).
94. See, e.g., Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational
Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 412–13 (2012).
95. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 526
(2005) (explaining the relationship between independent counsel and informed consent).
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complications is an advantage.
Fourth, agencies restructure surrogacy’s commodification and
contractual dimensions. Much of the objection to surrogacy comes from
the association between reproduction as an intimate activity and
payment, resulting in commodification. Yet, many of those who have
expressed concern about commodification do not necessarily wish to ban
surrogacy, and recognize that some compensation for pregnancy’s
intrusiveness, expense, inconvenience, and discomfort is appropriate. 96
One response is to consider how surrogacy’s business aspects, including
payment, can be structured to minimize its dehumanizing aspects. Such
measures include:
a) Fixed prices. Many parties find haggling over price unseemly,
particularly when the result creates higher prices for more favored
groups along lines such as race, nationality, class, and so on. The
Association of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has, for example, tried
to standardize payments to egg donors. 97 The creation of a standardized
price may constrain some of surrogacy’s commercialized aspects. As
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles observes, “capping the price reflects the desire to
ensure that surrogacy is not fully marketized but rather appreciated for
its dual function of creating intimate and monetary relationships.” 98
b) Staggered Payments. One of the differences between Baby M and
Calvert involved the difference between a lump sum payment upon birth
versus staggered payments over the pregnancy term. Whereas a lump
sum payment seems closer to baby-selling, staggered payments more
closely resemble compensation for services. Moreover, initial payments
acknowledge the surrogate’s assumption of a responsibility to the
intended parents from the beginning and mutual involvement in the
pregnancy.
c) Third party brokers. When third parties are not involved, the
intended parents and the carrier handle financial matters directly. Donald
96. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1247; Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1129, 1144–45 (2005); Michele Goodwin, Relational Markets in Intimate Goods, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 803, 810 (2009); Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1757
(2010); Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate
Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 544, 545
(2007); Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2349–50 (1995) (observing that she interviewed women who
had acted as surrogate mothers expecting to find exploitation of women who had agreed to become
surrogates because of the money involved and, instead, concluded that the potential risks are “rashly
speculative and bear no relationship to the arrangements as they currently exist.”); Sanger, supra
note 68, at 77–78.
97. But see Krawiec, supra note 96, at 1759–69.
98. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1264.
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Robinson, for example, hired his sister, commingled the proceeds from
her home’s sale with his own funds in purchasing and renovating the bed
and breakfast, and paid for the pregnancy’s medical costs. These
activities created numerous individual transactions that could lead to bad
will. Even the act of writing a check, particularly if the amount is not
fixed in advance, reminds the parties of the commercial nature of their
relationship, creating opportunities for potential disputes or simply
discomfort. In contrast, most agencies arrange for intended parents to
submit payments to the agency, which then disperses payments to the
surrogate. This allows the surrogate and the intended parents to interact
without having to discuss finances.
d) Acknowledgment of the non-pecuniary aspects of the surrogacy
relationship. As Laufer-Ukeles indicates, most studies find that altruistic
motivations are important to women who choose to be gestational
carriers, and their relationship with the intended parents greatly
influences their attitudes toward the experience.99 At the same time,
intended parents sometimes resent the carrier’s ability to produce a child
they cannot and may want to micromanage the carrier’s pregnancy, 100
dictating diet, exercise, and medications, or prohibiting alcohol, caffeine,
heavy lifting, sex, and travel. Third party professionals can be useful in
structuring these relationships. They can inform the parties about the
current medical opinion on such matters as use of caffeine (now thought
to be less harmful than a few years ago), routine exam frequency, or the
risk of travel close to the due date. 101 Third party professionals help to
create reasonable expectations by drafting contracts102 that shape and
clearly articulate understandings about factors such as diet, health care,
alcohol, sex, travel, participation in prenatal exams, delivery, and postbirth contact. In addition, they counsel intended parents 103 about the
nature of the relationships and appropriate etiquette. Finally, third party
professionals provide opportunities for the gestational carrier and the
intended parents to interact outside of formal or stressful events such as
99. Id. at 1233.
100. See, e.g., London, supra note 94, at 413.
101. See, e.g., Jennifer Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy, 22
BIOETHICS 269, 269–70, 275–76 (2008) (recommending counseling as a way to promote greater
autonomy and informed consent).
102. London, supra note 94, at 413.
103. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 616–17 (2011)
(suggesting informational counseling sessions as opposed to psychological screenings in the context
of reproductive choices); Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 49, at 34, 39 (evaluating effectiveness
of counseling).
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contract preparation or delivery of the child.
In short, the inclusion of agencies, as repeat players with a stake in
the smooth execution of surrogacy arrangements, helps to normalize
them. The agencies should screen out the most vulnerable participants,
shape the understandings of the parties in ways that minimize future
conflicts, provide professional legal and psychological assistance in
dealing with unexpected events, and structure the parties’ interactions in
ways that increase the likelihood of success and satisfaction. These
profit-driven agencies are, of course, more likely to take greater care if
their actions are visible and they may be called to account. Despite their
potential drawbacks, they still offer greater hope for the standardization
of appropriate norms than individually arranged transactions, whether
altruistic ones taking place with friends and family or foreign sojourns in
search of available services.
CONCLUSION
The surrogacy process, like the creation of any new family, involves
bringing people together who may have different assumptions,
experiences, and values. Institutions instantiate shared expectations and
norms about events, whether they are routine or more exotic
undertakings. Legal mandates and private contracts can encourage
surrogacy participants to develop shared expectations about the
experience, but are unlikely to occur without visibility, transparency, and
the involvement of third party professionals.
It should be noted that including these professionals can be expensive.
Indeed, the expense of assisted reproduction generally and surrogacy, in
particular, is fueling international medical tourism, which will make it
that much harder either to enforce surrogacy bans or to develop
appropriate, equitable, and non-exploitative practices. 104 In this context,
allowing commercial surrogacy in the United States, with appropriate
safeguards, may contribute to the development of established practices
that govern surrogacy globally. When surrogacy arrangements include
agencies and professionals with a stake in making these relationships
work, these arrangements safeguard the respect and dignity of both
surrogates and intended parents.

104. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1267–75.

